"Let me give you a definition of ethics: it is good to maintain and further life; it is bad to damage and destroy life."
-Albert Schweitzer
Foundations of Ethics
My book, Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to Economic Theory and Business, begins by taking issue with moral relativism and emotivism. Relativists maintain that morality is subjective and a matter of culture and upbringing without objective, universal standards of reference to assess truth values. Emotivists claim that moral propositions are bereft of meaning and are without cognitive content.
Using techniques of analysis developed principally by R. M. Hare, I argue that ethical propositions are governed by logic, which itself is governed by formal, objective, and universal rules. As such, quite aside from the truth values of moral terms, an ethical proposition is subject to a preferred standard of reasoning and cannot be deemed entirely relativistic. I cannot hold a contradictory moral position, for example, or mount a logically invalid argument.
Moreover, certain moral terms (e.g., good and bad) have evaluative properties, much in the same sense that terms such as larger or smaller or hotter and colder possess. We know that "this is a good act" bears similar meaning to "this is a good car" in this sense. Therefore, because moral propositions are both subject to logic and have an evaluative sense, it cannot be denied that moral arguments are subject to some objective, universal standards and that they have meaning, notwithstanding the fact people will disagree about the descriptive properties of moral terms and the absence of a preferred standard for ascertaining the truth or falsity of their claims.
Similarly, ethical "ought" statements have meaning not because they directly correlate to facts that obtain in the world, but because they say something about them. For example, in the proposition "One ought not to go into the burning house," the term "ought" says something about the facts, even though the term does not correspond to a state of affairs, and much in the same sense that certain logical terms also do not have descriptive properties (e.g., all, if, some).
Using these and other arguments, I thereby demonstrate that the broad metaethical positions of both moral relativists and emotivists (or non-cognitivists) are mistaken.
Normative Ethics
Having shown that ethical statements are at once meaningful and, at least in some sense, non-relativistic, I then set forth a normative system of ethics in my book. First, I argue that reason does not require morality and that rationality (in the self-interested, psychological sense of the word) does not require moral behavior. Rationality does not require morality. Unaided reason does not require it, though neither does it prevent it.
I make the argument that an ethical leap to universal moral rules is required by reason only when one conjoins certain of our rational requirements with acceptance of the principle of impartiality. By impartiality, I mean the rules are applied without regard to the outcome, that is, without bias for who stands to benefit (or lose). The fact remains, the acceptance of joining these principles is not a matter mandated by reason, though it may well be supported by utilitarian principles to the extent certain ends, such as survival of the species, are deemed worthy. The only solid and compelling justification for accepting impartiality as an operating principle might be Henry Sidgwick's intuition that, from the perspective of the universe, one person is no more important than another.
A universal system of ethics, by definition, means that all moral agents must be able to understand and act in accordance with the rules everywhere and all of the time. So what system of rules can be employed universally? We cannot implement our various conceptions of "the good" all of the time, for people disagree about what constitutes the good, and not everyone is even capable of having the same understanding by virtue of their geography, culture, and upbringing. Therefore, promoting good cannot be an acceptable basis for deriving universal rules. Also, it is physically impossible to maximize utility all of the time, and it is perhaps even irrational (against one's self-interest) to try and do so; consequently, utility cannot be the basis of universal rules. What everyone can understand and act upon all of the time, however, is that we ought to avoid intentionally causing others harm (death or suffering) without a reason, which is to say, without justification.
The universal rules derive from combining the rational prohibition against harming ourselves without a reason (something all rational people understand), with the principle of impartiality, which, by definition, extends the prohibition to others, and without regard to who gains or loses by applying the rule. For example, to desire one's own death, without a reason, is irrational - to desire a limit on one's present liberty, without a reason, is irrational. On the other hand, one might rationally desire death because it's preferable to extreme pain, or one might desire a limit to one's freedom for greater security, in other words, for a reason. These reasons can even be incorrect, for that does not necessarily make them irrational. Once we conjoin these principles with impartiality, to kill others or to disable them without justification (a reason that impartial rational people would accept) is immoral.
Universal ethical rules, therefore, can be derived by impartially extending our rational, egocentric constraints to others. I then posit a short list of rules against death, causing pain and disability, deceiving others, theft, and violating obligations. Their force or importance is roughly in that order, though there are exceptions (e.g., death can sometimes be preferable to pain or disability). One needs general rules or maxims in order to have a practical system that everyone can easily understand and act upon. Making exceptions to these general rules, however, is the key to understanding my system.
The general maxims are not themselves absolute or inviolable. One can violate them whenever exceptions would be acceptable to impartial and rational people. The means of doing this is to be able to will a universal prescription in conformance with logic, one that would apply to everyone in similar circumstances. I differ from Kant and borrow from Hare in this application, in that we must employ specificity and to take into consideration the facts that obtain in that particular circumstance as well as all similar ones. Thus, each general moral rule, e.g., "Do Not Kill," actually has what amounts to a qualifier appended to it, i.e., "...unless you can will a universal exception, taking into account the relevant universal properties of the circumstance, including the perspectives of the potential victims, and including oneself as a victim."
Ethics and Economic Theory
I then analyze various economic principles and determine that relatively open, market-based economies where property is held, exchanged, and disposed of relatively freely are the least problematic from a moral perspective, which is to say more consistent with the moral rules required by impartial rationality. In effect, it is the "default position" of morality. We are ethically obligated to refrain from taking the property of others or limiting their freedom (e.g., to trade or use their property in a particular way), without a reason that we can universalize given the same essential facts. Thus, property rights and the right to exchange are not unlimited or absolute. We can limit our rights when all rational participants, including potential victims, would prescribe a limitation to our freedom as a universal rule given the specific, relevant universal properties of the circumstance. It is thereby that "socialist acts" can be justified or even required by impartial rationality, notwithstanding the general applied principles governing economic freedom.
I am a Lockean in the sense that I maintain property rights derive from historical facts (acquired in accordance with morality) rather than being based on an end-state theory or what Robert Nozick calls a "pattern." However, unlike John Locke (or libertarians such as Ayn Rand), I do not believe they derive from nature or some mystical mix of man's labor and material or from our capacity for rationality. They result primarily and simply from the moral rule: do not steal, a principle that is itself derived from the impartial extension of a rational prohibition (i.e., no one would rationally desire what he possesses to be stolen without a reason).
Like Nozick, I do not believe a historical justification is without difficulty, as in cases where property was originally stolen (e.g., land taken by conquest or art stolen by Nazis), but that has been exchanged or handed down fairly afterward. In such cases, we must employ logic, law, and morality to resolve issues as best we can. This might well include reparations for past injustices where restoration as recompense is no longer practicable.
Ethics and Business
In the last part of the book, I examine the business enterprise. A principal focus is on fiduciary responsibility. A fiduciary is anyone who has duties towards others by virtue of their relationship, and when others have reasonable expectations by virtue of that relationship. I make a number of observations about corporate structure (specifically, governance and the roles of officers versus board members) and also about duties towards the environment, future generations, and animals. In the case of animals, the proper object of ethics is to avoid causing suffering, and impartiality requires us to take into account the suffering of animals in proportion to their consciousness and their capacity for suffering.
An important feature of my work on business ethics is that a corporate veil offers no moral protection for moral fiduciaries whose actions can cause death or suffering, even when it is indirect, to the extent that the fiduciary knew or should have known the result. Thus, a company that manufactures weapons shares in the responsibility for the death and suffering they might eventually cause, and it must be in a position to justify these outcomes through a kind of cost-benefit analysis using prescriptive universalization.
Moral Agency and the Moral Realm
Unlike many, perhaps most, philosophers, I do not believe morality pertains only to rational beings. Rationality is a requirement for moral agency, but not for membership in what I call the "moral realm," which can include other animals and future generations, or anything that is capable of losing consciousness or experiencing suffering. Because other animals can die and suffer, these things must be taken into account before violating the general maxims of morality. This has interesting consequences with respect to the food industry and the environment, generally. My views in relation to animals and rationality are not altogether dissimilar to the utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer.
I maintain that death and suffering are what constitutes "evil" in a non-theological sense; at least, that is how I choose to define evil. That which is evil must be that which all creatures seek to avoid, and what they seek to avoid the most is their own harm. Moreover, it is what morality by conjoining our rational requirements with impartiality requires us to avoid causing others. I contend that far too much attention has been paid by philosophers and others to promoting good, which cannot form the basis of a universal code of conduct, and that promoting good is not nearly as important as avoiding or preventing evil, which has a much greater impact on the world. Thus the title of my book: Do No Evil.
Addendum: Do No Evil was written nearly 20 years ago. I have not changed my views on the essential nature of morality. However, it would be a mistake to assume my book justifies an ideological or political position in relation to capitalism or socialism,. Markets have proved to be more optimal than not in proving the greatest benefit for the most people. But they are not without problems, and utilitarian arguments are not altogether persuasive given that slavery could be supported by such reasoning. I regret even using the terms socialism and capitalism, which are primarily ideological positions.
When it comes to economics, I am first and foremost an empiricist and not an ideologue. When it comes to morality, I am at once an empiricist and one who desires a particular kind of world. It would have been better to say the default (in the absence of other information or constraints) position of morality, which is to say, the initial position -- is that property "fairly acquired" is permissible, as are both its unfettered use and free exchange. But, and a strong but, at that, to the extent these acts will or are likely to result in untoward consequences, namely, death or suffering, exceptions are not only often justifiable, but they are morally required. In other words, interference with property rights and free markets is sometimes necessary.
Some Sources
M. E. Berumen Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to Economic Theory and Business, iUniverse, 2003
Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998.
R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, Clarendon Press, 1952.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford University Press, 1998.
Immanuel Kant, collected works on ethics in Practical Philosophy, Translated and Edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press.
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Ludwig von Mises, Socialism, An Economic and Sociological Analysis, Translated by J. Kahane, Liberty Fund, 1981.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971.
Reviews
-Albert Schweitzer
Foundations of Ethics
My book, Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to Economic Theory and Business, begins by taking issue with moral relativism and emotivism. Relativists maintain that morality is subjective and a matter of culture and upbringing without objective, universal standards of reference to assess truth values. Emotivists claim that moral propositions are bereft of meaning and are without cognitive content.
Using techniques of analysis developed principally by R. M. Hare, I argue that ethical propositions are governed by logic, which itself is governed by formal, objective, and universal rules. As such, quite aside from the truth values of moral terms, an ethical proposition is subject to a preferred standard of reasoning and cannot be deemed entirely relativistic. I cannot hold a contradictory moral position, for example, or mount a logically invalid argument.
Moreover, certain moral terms (e.g., good and bad) have evaluative properties, much in the same sense that terms such as larger or smaller or hotter and colder possess. We know that "this is a good act" bears similar meaning to "this is a good car" in this sense. Therefore, because moral propositions are both subject to logic and have an evaluative sense, it cannot be denied that moral arguments are subject to some objective, universal standards and that they have meaning, notwithstanding the fact people will disagree about the descriptive properties of moral terms and the absence of a preferred standard for ascertaining the truth or falsity of their claims.
Similarly, ethical "ought" statements have meaning not because they directly correlate to facts that obtain in the world, but because they say something about them. For example, in the proposition "One ought not to go into the burning house," the term "ought" says something about the facts, even though the term does not correspond to a state of affairs, and much in the same sense that certain logical terms also do not have descriptive properties (e.g., all, if, some).
Using these and other arguments, I thereby demonstrate that the broad metaethical positions of both moral relativists and emotivists (or non-cognitivists) are mistaken.
Normative Ethics
Having shown that ethical statements are at once meaningful and, at least in some sense, non-relativistic, I then set forth a normative system of ethics in my book. First, I argue that reason does not require morality and that rationality (in the self-interested, psychological sense of the word) does not require moral behavior. Rationality does not require morality. Unaided reason does not require it, though neither does it prevent it.
I make the argument that an ethical leap to universal moral rules is required by reason only when one conjoins certain of our rational requirements with acceptance of the principle of impartiality. By impartiality, I mean the rules are applied without regard to the outcome, that is, without bias for who stands to benefit (or lose). The fact remains, the acceptance of joining these principles is not a matter mandated by reason, though it may well be supported by utilitarian principles to the extent certain ends, such as survival of the species, are deemed worthy. The only solid and compelling justification for accepting impartiality as an operating principle might be Henry Sidgwick's intuition that, from the perspective of the universe, one person is no more important than another.
A universal system of ethics, by definition, means that all moral agents must be able to understand and act in accordance with the rules everywhere and all of the time. So what system of rules can be employed universally? We cannot implement our various conceptions of "the good" all of the time, for people disagree about what constitutes the good, and not everyone is even capable of having the same understanding by virtue of their geography, culture, and upbringing. Therefore, promoting good cannot be an acceptable basis for deriving universal rules. Also, it is physically impossible to maximize utility all of the time, and it is perhaps even irrational (against one's self-interest) to try and do so; consequently, utility cannot be the basis of universal rules. What everyone can understand and act upon all of the time, however, is that we ought to avoid intentionally causing others harm (death or suffering) without a reason, which is to say, without justification.
The universal rules derive from combining the rational prohibition against harming ourselves without a reason (something all rational people understand), with the principle of impartiality, which, by definition, extends the prohibition to others, and without regard to who gains or loses by applying the rule. For example, to desire one's own death, without a reason, is irrational - to desire a limit on one's present liberty, without a reason, is irrational. On the other hand, one might rationally desire death because it's preferable to extreme pain, or one might desire a limit to one's freedom for greater security, in other words, for a reason. These reasons can even be incorrect, for that does not necessarily make them irrational. Once we conjoin these principles with impartiality, to kill others or to disable them without justification (a reason that impartial rational people would accept) is immoral.
Universal ethical rules, therefore, can be derived by impartially extending our rational, egocentric constraints to others. I then posit a short list of rules against death, causing pain and disability, deceiving others, theft, and violating obligations. Their force or importance is roughly in that order, though there are exceptions (e.g., death can sometimes be preferable to pain or disability). One needs general rules or maxims in order to have a practical system that everyone can easily understand and act upon. Making exceptions to these general rules, however, is the key to understanding my system.
The general maxims are not themselves absolute or inviolable. One can violate them whenever exceptions would be acceptable to impartial and rational people. The means of doing this is to be able to will a universal prescription in conformance with logic, one that would apply to everyone in similar circumstances. I differ from Kant and borrow from Hare in this application, in that we must employ specificity and to take into consideration the facts that obtain in that particular circumstance as well as all similar ones. Thus, each general moral rule, e.g., "Do Not Kill," actually has what amounts to a qualifier appended to it, i.e., "...unless you can will a universal exception, taking into account the relevant universal properties of the circumstance, including the perspectives of the potential victims, and including oneself as a victim."
Ethics and Economic Theory
I then analyze various economic principles and determine that relatively open, market-based economies where property is held, exchanged, and disposed of relatively freely are the least problematic from a moral perspective, which is to say more consistent with the moral rules required by impartial rationality. In effect, it is the "default position" of morality. We are ethically obligated to refrain from taking the property of others or limiting their freedom (e.g., to trade or use their property in a particular way), without a reason that we can universalize given the same essential facts. Thus, property rights and the right to exchange are not unlimited or absolute. We can limit our rights when all rational participants, including potential victims, would prescribe a limitation to our freedom as a universal rule given the specific, relevant universal properties of the circumstance. It is thereby that "socialist acts" can be justified or even required by impartial rationality, notwithstanding the general applied principles governing economic freedom.
I am a Lockean in the sense that I maintain property rights derive from historical facts (acquired in accordance with morality) rather than being based on an end-state theory or what Robert Nozick calls a "pattern." However, unlike John Locke (or libertarians such as Ayn Rand), I do not believe they derive from nature or some mystical mix of man's labor and material or from our capacity for rationality. They result primarily and simply from the moral rule: do not steal, a principle that is itself derived from the impartial extension of a rational prohibition (i.e., no one would rationally desire what he possesses to be stolen without a reason).
Like Nozick, I do not believe a historical justification is without difficulty, as in cases where property was originally stolen (e.g., land taken by conquest or art stolen by Nazis), but that has been exchanged or handed down fairly afterward. In such cases, we must employ logic, law, and morality to resolve issues as best we can. This might well include reparations for past injustices where restoration as recompense is no longer practicable.
Ethics and Business
In the last part of the book, I examine the business enterprise. A principal focus is on fiduciary responsibility. A fiduciary is anyone who has duties towards others by virtue of their relationship, and when others have reasonable expectations by virtue of that relationship. I make a number of observations about corporate structure (specifically, governance and the roles of officers versus board members) and also about duties towards the environment, future generations, and animals. In the case of animals, the proper object of ethics is to avoid causing suffering, and impartiality requires us to take into account the suffering of animals in proportion to their consciousness and their capacity for suffering.
An important feature of my work on business ethics is that a corporate veil offers no moral protection for moral fiduciaries whose actions can cause death or suffering, even when it is indirect, to the extent that the fiduciary knew or should have known the result. Thus, a company that manufactures weapons shares in the responsibility for the death and suffering they might eventually cause, and it must be in a position to justify these outcomes through a kind of cost-benefit analysis using prescriptive universalization.
Moral Agency and the Moral Realm
Unlike many, perhaps most, philosophers, I do not believe morality pertains only to rational beings. Rationality is a requirement for moral agency, but not for membership in what I call the "moral realm," which can include other animals and future generations, or anything that is capable of losing consciousness or experiencing suffering. Because other animals can die and suffer, these things must be taken into account before violating the general maxims of morality. This has interesting consequences with respect to the food industry and the environment, generally. My views in relation to animals and rationality are not altogether dissimilar to the utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer.
I maintain that death and suffering are what constitutes "evil" in a non-theological sense; at least, that is how I choose to define evil. That which is evil must be that which all creatures seek to avoid, and what they seek to avoid the most is their own harm. Moreover, it is what morality by conjoining our rational requirements with impartiality requires us to avoid causing others. I contend that far too much attention has been paid by philosophers and others to promoting good, which cannot form the basis of a universal code of conduct, and that promoting good is not nearly as important as avoiding or preventing evil, which has a much greater impact on the world. Thus the title of my book: Do No Evil.
Addendum: Do No Evil was written nearly 20 years ago. I have not changed my views on the essential nature of morality. However, it would be a mistake to assume my book justifies an ideological or political position in relation to capitalism or socialism,. Markets have proved to be more optimal than not in proving the greatest benefit for the most people. But they are not without problems, and utilitarian arguments are not altogether persuasive given that slavery could be supported by such reasoning. I regret even using the terms socialism and capitalism, which are primarily ideological positions.
When it comes to economics, I am first and foremost an empiricist and not an ideologue. When it comes to morality, I am at once an empiricist and one who desires a particular kind of world. It would have been better to say the default (in the absence of other information or constraints) position of morality, which is to say, the initial position -- is that property "fairly acquired" is permissible, as are both its unfettered use and free exchange. But, and a strong but, at that, to the extent these acts will or are likely to result in untoward consequences, namely, death or suffering, exceptions are not only often justifiable, but they are morally required. In other words, interference with property rights and free markets is sometimes necessary.
Some Sources
M. E. Berumen Do No Evil: Ethics with Applications to Economic Theory and Business, iUniverse, 2003
Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998.
R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, Clarendon Press, 1952.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford University Press, 1998.
Immanuel Kant, collected works on ethics in Practical Philosophy, Translated and Edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press.
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Ludwig von Mises, Socialism, An Economic and Sociological Analysis, Translated by J. Kahane, Liberty Fund, 1981.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971.
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